02 / SEDUCTION · DUNK'S MARKING SCANDAL
SAME ESSAY. TWO MARKS.
You received 58 for work worth 68. Count the class vote to test what happens next.
INSIDE-OUT ECONOMICS01 / 03
01 / THE MARKINGONE LECTURER
Professor Dunk
“I've applied the same standards. Obviously.”
Your essay deserved 68. Dunk gave you 58.
What would you actually do?
58
10 marks too low
68
Same quality as friend's work
That is one bad mark. Now imagine Dunk repeats the same 10-mark penalty across new cohorts. Can your response change the pattern?
All students have the same lecturer and marker. Nobody can choose a different one.
02 / WHAT DOES THE CLASS DO?Count the live class votes
A Mark Dunk down

Give a poor student evaluation with a clear comment.

CLASS VOTES
0
B Go to Head of School

Formally complain about Dunk's marking behaviour.

CLASS VOTES
0
C Ignore it

Ten marks are annoying, but not worth the effort.

CLASS VOTES
0
D Moan privately

Tell a family friend you should've gone to Essex.

CLASS VOTES
0
A + B · COST TO DUNK—
C + D · NO SIGNAL—
Press + for each class vote. Use − to correct a count. All counters start at zero.
02 / SEDUCTION · FIVE-YEAR EXPERIMENT
FIVE YEARS OF UNDER-MARKING
Each year, new students face Dunk’s marking. Track the average penalty across cohorts.
ORIGINAL MARK 58 / 68CLASS A+B —
02 / 03
01 / ALL C + D · NO PRESSURE

THE PATTERN PERSISTS

Without a signal, Dunk repeats the same under-marking with each new cohort.
—
average marks lost per affected script
SYSTEMIC UNDER-MARKING · YEARS 0–5
COHORT AVERAGE MARKYear 0
—
Same unfair penalty, repeated every academic year.
02 / YOUR CLASS · ACTUAL VOTE

THE CLASS PATH

Your A+B share determines how quickly under-marking shrinks across new cohorts.
—
average marks lost per affected script
SYSTEMIC UNDER-MARKING · YEARS 0–5
COHORT AVERAGE MARKYear 0
—
Enter the vote to reveal the class's trajectory.
03 / ALL A + B · MAXIMUM PRESSURE

THE PATTERN FADES

The strongest pressure makes repeated under-marking costly, so the gap falls fastest.
—
average marks lost per affected script
SYSTEMIC UNDER-MARKING · YEARS 0–5
COHORT AVERAGE MARKYear 0
—
New cohorts face progressively less under-marking.
Year 0. All three futures start with a systemic 10-mark penalty per affected script. Run five years to see how later cohorts fare.
0 / 5
02 / SEDUCTION · THE POWER OF INCENTIVES
THE MARKET'S GREAT TRICK: PUNISHING INEFFICIENCY
The five-year charts model a recurring marking problem — not one corrected assignment.
INSIDE-OUT ECONOMICS03 / 03
One unfair mark. Now imagine it repeating.
Pressure can shrink the pattern, year after year.
What is measured? The average under-marking per affected script in each new academic cohort. Starting gap: 10 marks; correct mark: 68.
C + D · NO PRESSURE

Pattern survives

Without effective pressure, every later cohort still loses an average of ten marks on comparable work.
10 marks lost / script
YOUR CLASS · ACTUAL VOTE

Pattern shrinks

Your class’s A+B share sets the rate at which later cohorts lose fewer marks.
— marks lost / script
A + B · MAXIMUM PRESSURE

Fastest correction

Maximum student pressure creates the strongest incentive to stop under-marking future cohorts.
— marks lost / script
WHY THIS IS ONE OF THE WONDERS OF MARKETSCompetition turns poor performance into an economic disadvantage.
1. InefficiencyOne firm wastes resources producing the same output.
→
2. Higher costsWaste reduces profit margins or pushes up prices.
→
3. Better rivalsEfficient firms can charge less or earn more.
→
4. Market rewardsSales and investment flow to better performers.
→
5. Adapt or exitWasteful firms improve or lose ground.
THE BIG IDEA: Just as pressure reduces repeated marking errors, competitive markets can reward efficiency and squeeze out avoidable waste.
Model: the average mark penalty for affected scripts in each new cohort, not a count of students or a remark of the original script. Full A+B pressure removes 75% of the remaining gap each year; the class rate scales with its A+B share. Analogy: Dunk faces institutional/reputational incentives; markets discipline waste through competing prices and profits. All rates are illustrative assumptions.